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University of Wisconsin-Madison
One of the most significant and persistent differences between the 
behavior of men and women in the U.S. labor market is the greater 
variability in hours worked per week by women. In 1991, the median 
number of weekly hours worked by women in the labor force who 
were 18-60 years old was 40 hours, with substantial variation around 
this median. The first decile of the hours distribution for working 
women was 20 hours per week and the first quartile was 32 hours. This 
distribution has remained basically unchanged since at least 1979.'
The dominant factor thought to account for the greater variability 
in hours worked among women is gender specialization in household 
production activities, with women choosing to adjust the intensity of 
their labor-market activities in response to the demands placed on their 
time by other household members. In a simple labor-supply model, 
womens' wages are taken as exogenous to their labor-supply decisions, 
and women select hours of work based on other household income and 
the relative value of their market and household time. Thus, as the 
value of household time changes relative to market activity, the simple 
theory predicts that adjustments will be made in hours worked. How 
ever, research in recent years suggests that adjusting hours worked in 
response to changing labor-supply preferences is costly for women 
because of employer constraints on hours worked and incomplete 
information about the wage-hour combinations available in the market 
(e.g., Blank 1988; Altonji and Paxson 1988, 1991; Dickens and Lund- 
berg 1993). These constraints call into question the assumption that 
the wage rate is exogenous to the labor-supply decision.
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This chapter investigates a different demand-side constraint that 
may influence the labor-supply decisions of married women and that 
has not been previously investigated. I investigate how the correlation 
between hours worked per week and the structure of the compensation 
package offered by employers alters the labor-supply decisions of mar 
ried women in the United States. This study focuses on employer-pro 
vided health insurance and investigates how the demand for health 
insurance by married women alters their labor-supply decisions. 2 I 
hypothesize the demand by a married woman for a job with health ben 
efits is greater among those wives whose husbands do not have 
employer-provided health insurance as compared with households 
where husbands have jobs that provide health benefits. Because health 
insurance is typically not available to employees working less than 35 
hours per week, married women without spousal health insurance cov 
erage adjust their labor-supply decisions to obtain health benefits. To 
test this prediction, I use data on weekly hours worked and employer- 
provided health insurance (EPHI) for 1982 and 1992 as reported in the 
1983 and 1993 March Current Population Survey (CPS).
The results in this paper show that in 1992, married women whose 
husbands lacked employer-provided health benefits worked more hours 
per week than wives in households where their spouses had health 
insurance. In contrast, the 1982 estimates show no effect of husbands 
health insurance coverage on the labor supply decisions of wives. The 
differing results for the two time periods is explained by the decline in 
employer provided health insurance among married males between 
1982 and 1992. In 1982 some wives seeking a job with employer pro 
vided health insurance because their husbands lacked these benefits 
would have worked full time even if their husband had a job with 
EPHI. However, the decline in EPHI coverage among married males 
over the 1982-1992 time period from 0.67 to 0.62 caused working 
wives in some households in 1992 to seek full-time jobs with health 
benefits. By 1992 this included some households where the wife 
would have preferred to work part time if her husband had a job that 
provided health benefits. Thus, the employer constraint that full-time 
work is required to obtain health benefits was not binding on married 
women in 1982 but became binding by 1992 because of the decline in 
married male health insurance coverage.
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Compensating wage theory predicts that women choosing to work 
full time to obtain health insurance receive a lower wage compared to 
what they could earn if they accepted a full-time job without health 
insurance. Using the husband's health insurance coverage as an instru 
ment that is correlated with his wife's health insurance coverage but 
assumed to be uncorrelated with his wife's wage. I find the predicted 
negative relationship between the hourly wage of wives working full 
time and their estimate suggests that married women working full time 
accept about a 10 percent wage reduction in exchange for employer- 
provided health benefits.
EMPLOYER-PROVIDED HEALTH INSURANCE: THEORY 
AND EVIDENCE
The application of standard compensating wage theory to fringe 
benefits predicts that workers differ in their demand for employer-pro 
vided benefits and sort themselves across firms so the mix between 
wages and fringe benefits matches their preferences. Holding human 
capital and other variables influencing wages constant, workers that 
receive more generous fringe benefits receive a lower wage than com 
parable workers that prefer fewer fringe benefits (Rosen 1986). The 
standard figure illustrating this prediction is shown in Figure 1, where 
workers maximize their utility subject to a budget constraint that is 
defined by the human capital and ability levels. Worker A prefers a 
compensation package without any fringe benefits and Worker B 
accepts a job that provides both wages (WB) and fringe benefits (FBB).
This standard story of the relationship between wages and fringe 
benefits is complicated in the case of employer-provided health bene 
fits because of the private information employees and potential 
employees have about their demand for health care. Private informa 
tion held by individuals about their demand for health care creates an 
adverse selection problem for the firm if all employees are charged the 
same price for health insurance through an identical wage adjustment. 
There are several ways firms may respond to this adverse selection. 
Firms could individually adjust worker wages ex post based on the pat 
tern of health expenditure claims observed as worker tenure increases. 3
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Firms could also create rate classes based on expected health care costs 
(e.g., younger versus older workers) and adjust wages differently for 
workers in the different rate classes. 4 Although it is unclear which 
alternative firms will select, I hypothesize that most firms simply 
charge all employees the same price for health benefits in the form of 
lower wages and, like an insurance company, screen out less healthy 
workers and try to create a workforce with homogenous health 
demands that minimizes the subsidies from healthy to less healthy 
workers. This approach, of course, provides less healthy workers with 
a strong incentive to seek employment in firms that offer health insur 
ance so they can receive health benefits at a price that is less than their 
expected health care expenditures.
One strategy firms follow to screen out workers with high demand 
for health care is to limit health insurance coverage to full-time work 
ers. Such a policy reduces adverse selection in two ways. First, the 
ability to work full time may screen out workers with costly health care
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problems because these same health problems may preclude full-time 
employment. Second, limiting health insurance to only full-time 
workers ensures health care benefits are a small share of total compen 
sation. Health benefits are a relatively larger share of total compensa 
tion when they are provided to part-time workers, and this may cause 
some workers with very high demands for health insurance to work 
part time just for the health benefits.
Table 1 reports data from the health insurance questions in the 
1983 and 1993 March CPSs; the data show a strong positive relation 
ship between hours worked per week and health insurance coverage. 
The probability of having a job that provided health insurance 
increases modestly with hours worked up to 30 hours per week, 
increases substantially for those working 30-34 hours per week, and 
then increases very significantly at 35 or more hours per week (full- 
time employment).
Table 1 Employer Health Insurance Coverage by Hours Worked, 1982 
and 1992 (%)


















SOURCE: Author's tabulations from the March 1983 and 1993 CPS.
More direct evidence showing how employer policies prevent part- 
time workers from receiving health benefits is provided by the Fringe 
Benefit Supplement to the April 1993 CPS. This supplement included 
questions asking the reasons why respondents were not covered by 
employer-provided health benefits. Thirty-one percent of those work 
ing were not covered by employer-provided health benefits. Among 
those uncovered, 81 percent worked for an employer that did not pro 
vide health insurance to any of its employees and 19 percent were 
uncovered even though they worked for an employer that offered insur 
ance to some employees. Of the 19 percent uncovered, 11.17 percent 
(more than half) were ineligible because of their status as part-time
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employees. To summarize, the data suggest firms hiring part-time 
workers frequently do not offer health insurance to any employee or do 
not extend health insurance to the part-time workers in their workforce. 
I hypothesize this discrimination reflects firm efforts to minimize 
adverse selection by part-time workers who, for reasons unobserved by 
the firm, have a high demand for health insurance.
THE DEMAND FOR HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE 
AMONG MARRIED FEMALES
The prediction that married women adjust their labor-supply deci 
sions based on their husbands' health insurance coverage assumes the 
demand by wives for jobs with employer-provided health benefits is 
influenced by spousal coverage. In this section, I test this assumption 
and report estimates of the effect of husbands' health insurance cover 
age on the probability that wives have health insurance coverage 
through their employers. Table 2 shows the two by two table of own 
employer health coverage for working couples. The percentage of cou 
ples where neither individual had own employer health insurance 
increased slightly from 15.8 percent in 1982 to 17 percent in 1992. In 
1982, 31 percent of the sample included couples where both the hus 
band and wife were covered by their respective employers. By 1992, 
this percentage had dropped to 24.2 percent. Over the 10-year period,
Table 2 The Joint Distribution of Own Employer Health Insurance 
Coverage For Working Couples (%)a
_______Husband's coverage from own employer_______ 
Uncovered Covered
Wife's coverage



















'The top number is the cell percentage. The number in parentheses shows the cell 
sample sizes.
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there was also a slight increase in the share of couples where only the 
husband had coverage and a larger increase, from 16.6 to 20.8 percent, 
in the share of couples where only the wife had own employer cover 
age. This increase is consistent with data from other years (Olson 
1995) and suggests coverage through the wife's employer became a 
more important source of family coverage over the 10-year period.
One statistical model for describing the relationship between spou 
sal health insurance coverage is a binary probit model where the equa 
tion describing a wife's health insurance coverage from her own job 
includes her husband's coverage through his job as a covariate. Unfor 
tunately, the estimates from this single equation approach are likely to 
be biased because of the correlation between unobservables affecting 
the demand for health insurance coverage for both the husband and wife. 
To overcome this problem, I jointly estimate the husband's and wife's 
coverage and include the husband's coverage on his job in her health 
insurance equation. This model, a bivariate probit model with a struc 
tural shift (Heckman 1978), is described by the following equations:
$H +eH (1)
HI* W - Xw $w + aHIH + zw (2)
HI, = 1 if ///*, > 0, otherwise HI, = 0 where i = H or W (3)
) (4)
The subscripts in each equation refer to the husband (//) or wife 
(W), and HI*t is a latent variable indicating the propensity that a job 
provides health insurance. HI*, is a function of a set of observable 
exogenous factors and an unobserved, normally distributed error term. 
In this recursive model, a husband's health benefit status directly 
affects the probability that his wife has a job with health benefits, and 
a describes the causal effect of the husband's health benefits on the 
probability his wife has a job with health benefits. I hypothesize that 
a < 0. In other words, own employer coverage by the husband lowers 
the wife's demand for coverage through her job.
This model permits a nonzero correlation between the error terms 
in Eqs. 1 and 2 and is identified if there is at least one variable in Eq. 1
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that is excluded from Eq. 2. This exclusion restriction is satisfied by 
assuming the characteristics of the husband (e.g., education, age, race) 
that affect the probability that he has health benefits on his job do not 
directly affect HI* W The Xl matrices include individual characteristics 
typically used in an earnings function: years of completed education, 
age, age2, age3 , three race and ethnic variables, the number of children 
in the household under the age of 6, the number of children aged 6-17 
years old, and three region dummies. The data for each year were con 
structed by creating separate data files from the 1983 and 1993 March 
CPSs for husbands and wives and merging these files using the house 
hold, family, and individual identification codes.
The results in Table 3 show health insurance coverage increases 
with age and level of education and is lower for minorities than for 
white workers. The coefficient on husband's health insurance coverage 
is in the expected negative direction in both 1982 and 1992, and the 
parameter estimates are virtually the same. The negative coefficients 
on husband's coverage imply that women married to husbands without 
health benefits were more likely to be working on jobs that provide 
health insurance than working wives whose husbands had health bene 
fits. In 1993, the predicted probability that an "average" working wife 
had a job with health benefits was 0.533 if the husband did not have 
health benefits and 0.302 if the husband had a job with health benefits. 5
Alternatives to the Bivariate Probit Model
The recursive structure of the bivariate model describes by Equa 
tions l~4 is a necessary assumption of the statistical model because of 
the cross-sectional data and the latent variable formulation of health 
insurance coverage. As Heckman (1978) showed, a simultaneous 
latent variable model where each individual's health insurance cover 
age casually affects the coverage of his or her spouse is logically 
inconsistent. However, there is another recursive model, alternative to 
Equations 1-4, which reverses the recursive structure and assumes a 
wife's coverage is exogenous and has a causal effect on the coverage of 
her husband. Such a model may be appropriate for some couples, and 
the model reported in Table 3 is obviously misspecified for these cou 
ples. Choosing between these two alternative recursive models is diffi 
cult. The best solution is to have sample information (e.g., longitudinal 
data) that could be used to identify which spouse's coverage is exoge-
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Table 3 Bivariate Probit Estimates of Own Employer Health Benefit 






























































































































































































NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.
nous and then estimate different recursive models for the two types of 
couples. Unfortunately, this sample separation information is not 
available in the March CPSs.
An alternative method of investigating the sensitivity of the esti 
mates obtained from the recursive structure defined by Equations 1-4 
is to use Two-Stage Least Squares (TSLS) and estimate a two equation 
simultaneous equation model of husbands' and wives' coverage where 
the coverage of each spouse affects the coverage of the other. Each 
equation in this two equation system is identified because the hus 
band's (wife's) individual characteristics (age, race, and education) are 
assumed to be exogenous to the own employer health coverage of the 
wife (husband). TSLS avoids the recursive structure constraint 
required of the bivariate probit model because it ignores the latent vari 
able formulation. However, like a single equation linear probability 
model, the TSLS does not account for the fact that health insurance 
coverage can only take on a value of 0 or 1. The coefficients are, how 
ever, unbiased if the exclusion restrictions are appropriate.
The TSLS model estimates in Table 4 suggest a wife's coverage 
does affect her husband's coverage, and the point estimate of this effect 
was larger in 1982 than in 1992. However, the estimated effect of the 
husband's coverage on the wife's coverage was much larger than the 
effect of wife's coverage on husband's coverage in both years—nearly 
twice as large in 1982 and almost three times larger in 1992. In addi-
Health Insurance and the Wages of Married Women 305
Table 4 TSLS Estimates of Wives and Husbands Own Employer Health 
Insurance (HI) Coverage3
Dependent variable 










Husband's HI -0.3205 -0.2953 
(0.0461) (0.0500)
'Each model also includes the variables reported in Table 3. Standard errors are in 
parentheses.
tion, the coefficient of-0.295 on husband's coverage in 1992 implies an 
almost 30 percentage point effect of a husband's coverage on the prob 
ability that his wife is covered by health insurance from her employer. 
This value is close to the predicted 23.1 percentage point difference 
(0.533 - 0.202) previously reported from the bivariate probit estimates 
for an average couple.
These TSLS results suggest that there are some couples where the 
husband's coverage is affected by his wife's coverage. However, the 
more common occurrence appears to correspond to the model 
described by Equations 1-4, where the husband's coverage is exoge 
nous. While the joint determination of spousal coverage deserves addi 
tional research with better data, these results support the conclusion 
that, for many couples, a wife's demand for employer-provided health 
insurance is causally affected by her husband's coverage.
Coverage Versus Eligibility for Health Insurance
The health insurance questions in the two March CPSs solicit 
information on whether or not household members are covered by 
employer-provided health insurance obtained from an employer. As 
previously discussed, there are two distinct subgroups among uncov 
ered workers. An uncovered individual could be ineligible for insur 
ance because the employer does not offer insurance or because he/she 
works for an employer that offered health insurance but, for various
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reasons, the individual was not eligible for coverage. It is also possible 
an uncovered individual is eligible for employer-provided health bene 
fits but voluntarily decides not to accept the coverage, perhaps because 
of the cost of health insurance (e.g., substantial premium copayments) 
or because of spousal coverage.
The distinction between uncovered individuals who are ineligible 
for coverage but select out of coverage is critical for this analysis. The 
bivariate probit and TSLS estimates show wives whose husbands are 
uncovered by health benefits are more likely to be covered by own 
employer health benefits. I interpret this estimate to mean a husband's 
coverage affects a wife's demand for a job where she is eligible for 
insurance, and it is this demand for health insurance eligibility that 
leads some women to adjust their labor supply and shift from part-time 
to full-time employment. In the March CPS data, it is impossible to 
distinguish between this explanation and the alternative explanation 
that wives with spousal coverage choose not to accept coverage even 
though they are eligible because of their husbands' insurance coverage. 
If this latter explanation is the dominant causal explanation, then the 
estimates in Table 3 are biased estimates of the effect of husbands' 
coverage on the labor-supply decisions of wives.
While the March surveys do not identify the reasons individuals 
are not covered by employer health insurance, this information is avail 
able from the April 1993 CPS. Figure 2 shows a tree diagram of the 
distribution of coverage and eligibility for working wives included in 
the April survey. Of those not covered by own employer health insur 
ance, 62.4 percent are ineligible for coverage through their employer. 
The remaining share of uncovered wives are eligible for coverage but 
have not taken advantage of the health benefits. Most (87.8 percent) of 
those that elect no coverage are covered by their husband's employer- 
provided health insurance (EPHI); overall, 29 percent of those not cov 
ered by their own EPHI are covered by their husband's EPHI.
Fully modeling the joint decisions of couples that determine both 
coverage and eligibility is beyond the scope of this paper. However, I 
did estimate the bivariate probit model described by Equations 1-4 
using the April data, for which the dependent variable for the wife indi 
cates eligibility for coverage. The coefficient on spouse's coverage in 
the wife's eligibility equation was -0.6975 with a standard error of 
0.260, very similar to the estimates reported in Table 3. These results


























SOURCE: Author's calculations from the April 1993 CPS (n = 5077 married couples).
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suggest that the effect of spousal coverage reported in Table 3 is domi 
nated by the effect of husband's coverage on eligibility and not seri 
ously biased by wives who are eligible through their employers for 
coverage but decide to decline coverage.
LABOR SUPPLY DECISIONS OF WORKING WIVES
The estimates in Tables 3 and 4 show spousal health insurance cov 
erage significantly increases a working wife's demand for a job with 
health benefits. To meet this demand, I hypothesize that some wives 
lacking spousal coverage work full time to obtain health insurance but 
would have preferred to work fewer hours if their husbands had jobs 
with health benefits. This labor-supply adjustment occurs because of 
the limited supply of part-time jobs offering health insurance.
Table 5 provides simple descriptive statistics from the 1983 and 
1993 March CPSs that are consistent with this hypothesis. The table 
shows hours worked per week by working, married women as a func 
tion of husband's health insurance coverage. The mean number of 
hours worked per week was 33.9 in 1982; the median was 40 hours per 
week and two-thirds of the wives in the sample usually worked 35 or 
more hours per week. Rows 2 and 3 of the table breakdown the sample 
based on husband's health insurance coverage. The mean number of 
hours worked per week in 1982 was 1.5 hours greater for wives whose
Table 5 Wives' Average Hours Worked per Week by Spousal Health 








































SOURCE: Authors calculations from 1983 and 1993 March CPS. 
a If HI = 1, the husband has health insurance; if HI = 0, he does not.
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husbands did not have health insurance. In addition, the percentage of 
wives working 35 or more hours per week was 64.9 percent for house 
holds where the husband had health insurance and 70.3 percent in 
households where the husband lacked health insurance. The difference 
by spousal health benefit coverage in the fraction of married women 
working 35 or more hours per week had increase in 1992 to 8.1 per 
centage points.
While other factors correlated with labor supply and husbands 
health insurance coverage (e.g., husband's income) are not controlled 
for in Table 5, a simple difference-in-difference estimator calculated 
over the time period suggests spousal coverage had an effect on the 
labor-supply decisions of some wives. Specifically, the change over 
the 10 years in the fraction of married women working full time (e.g., 
35 hours/week) was 0.0423 and the fraction of husbands with health 
insurance declined by 0.054. This implies a one point decline in the 
fraction of husbands without health benefits led to 0.78 point increase 
in the percentage of wives working full time (e.g., 0.0423 / -0.0541). 
The other noteworthy fact from Table 5 is the difference in the fraction 
of wives working full time by spousal coverage may have had a bigger 
effect on labor supply in 1992 than in 1982.
The inferences that can be drawn from Table 5 obviously do not 
control for individual and family characteristics that influence labor 
supply and are possibly correlated with husbands health insurance cov 
erage or change in the status of husbands health insurance coverage. 6
To address this concern, Table 6 reports ordinary least square 
(OLS) estimates of the hours worked per week in 1982 and 1992 as a 
function of education, three race/ethnicity dummies, age, the presence 
and age of children in the household, husbands income, and whether or 
not the husband has health insurance on his job. 7 The parameter esti 
mates on the control variables are all in the expected direction and con 
sistent with prior research. The estimate on husband's health insurance 
coverage is also in the predicted negative direction in both years. How 
ever, the estimated parameter is smaller in 1982 and is not significantly 
different from zero at the 0.05 level. In 1992, however, the coefficient 
is much larger and more precisely estimated. The 1992 estimate sug 
gests that married women whose husbands did have health insurance 
worked an average of 1.5 hours less per week relative to women whose 
husbands did not have health insurance. I interpret this estimate as the
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Health Insurance and the Wages of Married Women 311
average labor-supply response of women caused by the effect of spou 
sal coverage on the choice between a part-time job without health ben 
efits and a full-time job with benefits.
There are several alternative explanations for the results in Table 6. 
First, husband's health insurance coverage may simply index "better" 
jobs. Thus, in households where the husband has a better job as mea 
sured by the presence of health insurance, the wife works fewer hours 
per week because her husband has a "good" job. This alternative 
explanation could conceivably explain the difference between the esti 
mated effect of husband's health insurance coverage in 1982 and 1992 
because there was a decline in health insurance coverage among men 
over this time period that was most pronounced among less educated 
men with little work experience (Olson 1995). Thus, health insurance 
coverage in 1992 was a better predictor of "good" jobs than health 
insurance coverage in 1982. While it is difficult to rule out this alterna 
tive explanation, I think it is an unlikely explanation for the results 
since the model also controls for husbands earned income. Therefore, 
this explanation requires that the distinction between "good" and "bad" 
jobs is correlated with health insurance coverage after conditioning on 
husband's income.
A second explanation for the results in Table 6 is that the effect of 
husband's health insurance coverage on the labor supply simply 
reflects the income effect of these health benefits. However, the mag 
nitude of the coefficient on husband's health coverage in 1992 is sim 
ply too big for this explanation to be plausible. Ten thousand dollars in 
husband's income in 1992 produces a predicted 0.4 hour decline in the 
work week. If the effect of husband's health coverage was due only to 
the income effect, the estimate of 1.458 on the health coverage variable 
corresponds to an income effect equivalent to about $40,000 (e.g., 
1.458 / 0.036). Since health insurance is substantially less expensive 
than $40,000, the estimated effect of husband's health insurance in his 
wife's labor supply cannot be accounted for by the income effect of the 
benefit. This explanation is more plausible in 1982 because the coeffi 
cient on husband's health insurance implies the income value of health 
benefits was about $5,600 (e.g., 0.351 / 0.062). While group health 
insurance in 1982 was also less expensive than this point estimate, 
given the standard errors around the parameter estimates, it is possible
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that a husband's health insurance had an effect on his wife's labor sup 
ply in 1982 due primarily to the income effect.
What accounts for the different effect of husband's health insur 
ance coverage on their wives' labor-supply decisions in 1982 and 
1992? One explanation is that the relative increase in the cost of health 
care between 1982 and 1993 increased household demand for health 
insurance because the higher cost of health care raised the risk of not 
having health insurance. This increase in demand caused more wives 
without health insurance to work full time to obtain employer-provided 
health insurance. While this explanation is intuitively appealing, it is 
not consistent with the bivariate probit results reported in Table 2. If 
this explanation accounted for the differing results, I would have 
expected husbands health insurance coverage to have a bigger effect on 
the probability a wife held a job with health benefits in 1992 than in 
1982. As discussed above, this is not the case; the coefficient on hus 
band's health insurance coverage in the wife's health insurance equa 
tion is virtually the same for the two time periods.
The differing effect of a husbands coverage on his wife's hours 
worked in the two time periods is more easily explained by the decline 
in health insurance coverage among married males. The probability 
that husbands in the sample had employer-provided health benefits 
declined from 0.67 in 1982 to 0.62 in 1992. This fact suggests that 
wives who worked full time in 1982 and were married to husbands 
without coverage would have worked full time even if their husbands 
had held a job with health insurance. In 1992, however, the decline in 
health insurance coverage among husbands meant that more house 
holds were faced with the prospect of not having any employer-pro 
vided health insurance. This new segment of potentially uninsured 
households included families where the woman would have preferred 
to work part time if her husband had a job with health benefits but 
increased her work week to full time to obtain health benefits. This 
explanation suggest the full-time hours constraint that had to be met to 
obtain health insurance was not binding on wives in 1982 but was 
binding on the labor-supply decision of some wives in 1992. 8
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QUANTILE REGRESSION AND MULTINOMIAL LOGIT 
ESTIMATES OF HOURS WORKED
The OLS estimates reported in Table 6 will not adequately capture 
the changes in the hours distribution resulting from differences in hus 
band's health insurance coverage if the impact of spousal coverage var 
ies at different values of the hours distribution. The OLS estimates for 
1992 that describe a simple mean shift in the conditional hours distri 
bution by the 1.5 hours is not sufficient to move workers from part- 
time to full-time status except for those workers already very close the 
margin between full-time and part-time employment. Moreover, it is 
likely that those women close to the margin between full-time and part- 
time work were most affected by their husbands' health insurance sta 
tus because a full-time job with health insurance involves only a mod 
est increase in hours worked.
This suggests the difference in the hours distribution between 
wives with and without spousal health benefits will look like Figure 3 
if the employer constraint hypothesis is correct. Compared to house 
holds where the husband has health benefits, in households where the 
husband does not have health insurance, the distribution has less mass 
immediately below full-time employment and more mass at full-time 
employment (e.g., 35-40 hours per week). However, the tails of the 
two distributions are similar for two reasons. First, the lower tails of 
the hours distributions are similar because of the high cost of full-time 
employment for wives that would otherwise prefer to work substan 
tially less than full time. The upper tails do not differ by husbands 
coverage because working substantially more than 35-40 hours per 
week has no impact in the probability a woman has a job with health 
benefits. The OLS estimates cannot capture the differential behavioral 
responses of women at different points of the hours distribution.
Quantile regression was used to test if the impact of husbands cov 
erage on the distribution of hours worked by married women is consis 
tent with Figure 2. 9 Separate quantile regression models were 
estimated for the 10th, 15th, 20th, 25th, 30th, 35th, 40th, and 90th per- 
centiles of the conditional hours distribution, where each model 
included the same exogenous variables used in the OLS estimates. A 
comparison of the coefficients on husband's health insurance coverage
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Figure 3 Predicted Effect of Husband's HI on f(hours) 
for Working Wives
f(hours/wk)
Husband has HI 
Husband has no HI
20 40
Hours/wk
across these different quantile regressions identifies the portion of the 
conditional hours distribution most affected by husband's health insur 
ance overage.
Table 7 reports the key results from the quantile regressions for 
each of the two years. Consistent with the OLS results, the coefficient 
estimates for 1982 are all insignificant and show husbands health 
insurance had no impact on any point of the hours distribution for mar 
ried working women. In contrast, the negative and significant coeffi 
cients for 1992 show fewer women worked part time when their 
husbands did not have health insurance. Furthermore, the larger (in 
absolute value) coefficients at 21-30 hours suggest that the lack of 
spousal coverage had the biggest impact on women that were already 
working more than half time. However, at the 40th percentile (about 
40 hours per week), there was only a very modest difference (0.7 of an 
hour) between those with and without spousal health insurance. This 
pattern of results is consistent with the hypothesized effect summarized 
in Figure 3, where the differences in the distribution become very mod 
est once the full-time threshold is reached.
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Table 7 Summary of the Quantile Regression Estimates of the Effect of 







































































NOTE: Each quantile regression includes controls for education, race, age, children in 
the family, and husband's earning. Standard errors are in parentheses.
I next estimated separate quantile regressions for points of the 
cumulative hours distribution over two ranges—(0.01, 0.46) and (0.87, 
0.95)—to more fully describe the impact of husband's health benefits 
on hours worked by women in 1992. 10 Models were estimated at 0.01 
intervals, and the results were then used to predict and plot the esti 
mated cumulative conditional weekly hours distribution for two work 
ing wives that were identical except for husband's health insurance 
benefits."
Figure 4 shows that, among women with average sample charac 
teristics, those wives most likely to increase hours from part time to 
full time because their husbands lack coverage were wives who would 
have been working close to full time even if their husbands had health
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benefits. 12 Figure 4 shows that about 29 percent of those without spou 
sal health insurance would have worked 30 or fewer hours. In contrast, 
about 33 percent of those with spousal coverage would have worked 30 
or fewer hours per week. Note, however, that the distributions are very 
similar up to about 15 hours per week and then converge once again at 
about 37 hours per week. These differences correspond to the hypoth 
esized differences in the probability density functions shown in Figure 
3. In other words, the estimates suggest that in 1992 the lack of spou 
sal coverage caused a small fraction of wives to work full time and 
obtain a job with health insurance instead of working 15-35 hours per 
week without health benefits.
Figure 4 shows the predicted marginal effect of husband's cover 
age on hours worked for a wife with average sample characteristics. 
The position of this predicted conditional density of hours worked by 
spousal coverage will differ from Figure 4 for women with different 
characteristics. For this reason, Figure 4 cannot be interpreted as the 
average effect in the sample of spousal coverage on hours worked but 
only the marginal effect for wives with the average characteristics.
Estimates from a multinomial logit model of hours worked can be 
used to obtain an estimate of the average effect of husband's coverage 
on hours worked for the sample, which does permit husband's cover 
age to have a different effect on different portions of the hours distribu 
tion (e.g., Figure 3). This is accomplished by dividing the hours 
distribution into non-overlapping intervals and predicting the effect of 
spousal coverage on the probability that hours of work for wives fall in 
each interval.
Such a model was estimated for 1992 using the same independent 
variables included in the OLS and quantile regression models. The 
dependent variable was constructed by classifying the hours worked by 
wives into one of the following ranges: 1-10 hours, 11-20 hours, 21- 
30 hours, 31-34 hours, 35-39 hours, exactly 40 hours, and more than 
40 hours.
To conserve space, I have not reported the coefficients for the mul 
tinomial model. 13 However, the hypothesis that husband's health insur 
ance has no effect on wife's coverage was easily rejected, as was the 
hypothesis that husband's coverage had the same effect on the proba 
bility of being in each interval of the hours distribution. 14 Table 8 illus 
trates the predicted effect of husband's coverage on wife's coverage
Figure 4 Predicted Conditional CDF (Hours) for an Average Wife
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 
CDF(Hours Worked/Week)
0.8 0.9 1
Husband's Hl=0 — Husband's Hl=1
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Table 8 Predicted Average Effect from Multinomial Logit Model of 
Husband's Coverage on Hours Worked by Wives, 1992
Predicted percentage in each weekly hours range 
Hours/week range_____Husband is covered_____Husband is uncovered
I-10 4.70 4.36
II-20 12.42 9.33 
21-30 12.75 10.31 
31-34 2.79 2.48 
35-39 10.23 10.85 
Exactly 40 44.20 47.51 
>40 12.92 15.16 
Total_________________100.00_____________100.00_____
NOTE: These predictions are based on a multinomial logit model that includes all of 
the variables reported in column 2 of Table 3.
obtained from the multinomial logit model. The estimates were used 
to calculate two probabilities for each person—one where husband's 
coverage is set equal to 0 and a second probability where husband's 
coverage is set equal to 1. The probabilities for each hours range were 
then averaged over the entire sample and are reported in Table 8. The 
differences between columns 1 and 2 of Table 8 show the predicted 
average effect of spousal coverage on the probability wives worked in 
each hours range. For example, the first row shows husband's cover 
age had a very small effect (4.7 - 4.36) on the probability wives 
worked 1-10 hours per week.
Overall, the results reported in Table 8 are consistent with the theo 
retical predictions and the OLS and Quantile regression estimates. The 
average effect of spousal coverage on the probability a wife works full 
time (35 or more hours) was 6.17 percentage points (e.g., 47.51 + 
15.16 + 10.85 - 44.20 - 12.92 - 10.23). As rows 2 and 3 of the table 
show, this shift to full-time work was generated primarily by a reduc 
tion in the probability of working 11-30 hours per week.
The estimates reported in Table 8 were used to generate an esti 
mate of the impact of husband's coverage on the expected number of 
hours worked by wives. This was obtained using the midpoints of each
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hours range to calculate a weighted average for hours worked using the 
estimates in each column as weights. 15 This exercise produced the fol 
lowing values:
E (Hours \HIH =l) = 34.31 
E (Hours !#/„ = 0) = 35.74
The difference between these two values, 1.43 hours, is an estimate 
of the average effect of husbands' coverage on wives' labor supply. 
This is about a 4 percent effect (1.43/34.31) and very close to the 1.5 
hours obtained from the OLS model.
ESTIMATES OF THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN WAGES 
AND HEALTH BENEFITS
In this section I report estimates of the wage-health benefit trade 
off faced by married women predicted by compensating wage theory. 
To estimate this trade-off, I confined the sample to married women that 
were in the Outgoing Rotation Group subsamples in the March 1993 
CPS and that worked 35 or more hours per week. The sample was lim 
ited to wives working 35 or more hours per week because this appears 
to be the threshold between full-time and part-time employment 
(Hotchkiss 1991). Restricting the sample to the Outgoing Rotation 
Group allowed use of union status and usual weekly earnings ques 
tions. The latter question permits a better measure of the hourly wages 
than that which is available for the entire March CPS.
The usual empirical strategy for determining the magnitude (and 
existence) of the wage-fringe benefit trade-off is to estimate a standard 
earnings equation and include as one of the independent variables the 
presence or absence of health insurance. Frequently, however, this 
strategy does not provide results consistent with the theory, and the 
usual explanation is that the fringe benefit dummy is correlated with 
the error term in the wage equation because of unobserved factors 
(e.g., unobserved human capital) that have an impact on both wage lev 
els and health insurance coverage (Smith and Ehrenberg 1983). The
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OLS estimate reported in Table 9 suffers from this problem. The OLS 
coefficient on wife's coverage in a standard wage model is positive, 
highly significant, and implies married women with coverage receive a 
17.8 percent wage premium. 16
Table 9 OLS and IV Estimates of the Trade-Off between Wages and 


















































































NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.
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An unbiased estimate of the health insurance/wage trade-off can be 
obtained using an instrument correlated with wife's coverage but 
uncorrelated with the error term in her wage equation. The variable I 
used as an instrument for her coverage is her husband's coverage 
through his employer. 17 As the estimates in Table 2 show, husband's 
health insurance coverage has a strong effect on the probability his 
wife has health insurance on her job. Using this variable as an instru 
ment for HIW , the coefficient on HIW is negative and implies women 
with health insurance earn about 11 percent less than comparable 
women without health insurance. This estimate is consistent with the 
theory of compensating wage differentials.
SUMMARY
The primary purpose of this study was to investigate the relation 
ship between employer-provided health insurance and the labor-supply 
decisions of married women. I argue that the demand by a married 
woman for a job with health insurance is heavily influenced by 
whether or not her husband has health insurance through his employer. 
Where husbands lack health insurance coverage, married working 
women are more likely to be found in jobs that provide health benefits. 
This bivariate estimates using both 1982 and 1992 data strongly sup 
port this prediction.
Employer efforts to minimize adverse selection in the provision of 
health benefits limits the supply of part-time jobs that provide health 
benefits. As a result, individuals typically have to work full time to 
obtain a job with health insurance. This constraint implies husbands 
health insurance coverage will have an effect on the labor supply deci 
sions of working wives without spousal coverage who seek health 
insurance through their employer. The estimates for 1982 fail to sup 
port the hypothesis that spousal health insurance coverage changed the 
labor supply of women in 1982. In contrast, there was a small but sig 
nificant increase in hours worked in 1992 by those women married to 
men without health insurance. The differing results for the two time 
periods is explained by the decline in employer-provided health insur 
ance among husbands. In 1982, the requirement that wives worked full
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time to obtain health insurance was not binding, but the decline in cov 
erage among husbands became binding by 1992 and caused some 
wives to shift from part-time to full-time employment to obtain health 
coverage.
The quantile regression and multinomial logit estimates for 1992 
suggest that most of the shift in hours occurred among women who 
would have preferred to work 10-35 hours with spousal coverage but 
increased their work week to 35-50 hours per week to obtain health 
insurance. The multinomial logit estimates suggest that, on average, a 
change in husband's coverage alters the probability his wife works full 
time by about 9.2 percent.
Finally, estimates of the determinants of the hourly wage for mar 
ried women working full-time in 1993 supports the trade-off between 
wages and health benefits that is predicted by compensating wage 
theory.
Notes
The author has benefited from helpful comments by Ron Ehrenberg, Jonathan Gruber, 
Doug Hyatt, and seminar participants at Princeton University and Columbia Univer 
sity.
1. This statement is based on my tabulations of the usual weekly hours from the 
1979-1991 Outgoing Rotation Group (ORG) file of the Current Population Sur 
vey. The data were from the National Bureau of Employment Research CD 
extract of the ORG.
2. The analysis focuses on hours worked per week conditional on participation in the 
labor market. I do not investigate the impact of health benefits on the labor-force 
participation decision.
3. This approach is not without problems. First, it may take considerable time 
before the firm is able to distinguish between claims due to purely random health 
shocks and claims that reveal information about the underlying but unobserved 
health status of the individual and other family members. Second, if the external 
labor market doesn't observe the information on health status that is revealed to 
the firm, the firm may be unable to retain the worker because his or her total com 
pensation net of the firm's estimate of expected health claims will fall below the 
worker's opportunity wage in the external market.
4. The firm may face discrimination charges if it adjusts wages based on certain pre 
dictors of health claims such as age and sex.
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5. By "average" I mean a 30-year-old, white, high school-educated, working wife 
living in the Northeast with one child under the age of 6 and one child 6 to 17 
years old.
6. For example, the difference-in-difference estimator calculated from changes of 
the 10-year period will substantially overstate the effect of husband's coverage on 
the fraction of wives working full time if, between 1982 and 1992, broader 
changes in the commitment of wives to full-time employment were occurring. 
The difference-in-difference estimator would mistakenly attribute the impact of 
these changes to the decline in husband's health coverage.
7. Whether or not the wife has health insurance on her job is not included in her 
labor-supply equation because health insurance coverage and hours worked are 
assumed to be jointly chosen by the wife, given the employer constraints that full- 
time work is required to receive health benefits. Therefore, this labor-supply 
equation is most appropriately thought of as a "reduced form" equation where 
husband's health insurance coverage influences both the wife's coverage and her 
labor-supply decision.
8. Another explanation for the differing results is that firms were less likely to offer 
health benefits to part-time workers in 1992 and, therefore, the hours constraint 
became binding on more households. The results in Table 1 do not support this 
explanation.
9. Quantile regression is most commonly used to estimate how exogenous variables 
influenced the median of the dependent variable.
10. Approximately 41 percent (0.87 - 0.46) of the sample worked exactly 40 hours 
per week, which was the median for virtually all groups in the sample. Thus, dif 
ferences in the exogenous variables had no impact on this mass point in the hours 
distribution, and models for values in the (0.47, 0.86) range were not "identified."
11. The predictions were based on a 30-year-old, white, high school-educated woman 
living in the Northeast with one child under 6 and another child between 6 and 17 
years old.
12. Note that the axes in this graph are reversed from what is customary. The cumula 
tive distribution function (CDF) of hours worked is on the horizontal axis and the 
vertical axis plots the predicted hours worked at each point of the CDF.
13. These coefficients are available from the author upon request.
14. A likelihood ratio test of the hypothesis that husband's coverage had no effect on 
wife's coverage produced an ^ value of 77.82, and the critical value for 6 d.f. and 
0.001 significance level is 22.5. The likelihood ratio test of the hypothesis that 
husband's coverage has an equal effect on the chances of being in each hours 
interval produced an £ value of 76.78, and the critical value for 5 d.f. and 0.001 
significance level is 20.5.
15. For the over 40 hours per week category, I used the average number of hours
worked for those working more than 40 hours per week (e.g., 50.33 hours). 
16 The premium is equal to exp. (0.1636) - 1.
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17. The estimate of p, the correlation between the error terms in the two health insur 
ance equations reported in Table 2, is not different from zero in 1992. This sug 
gests husband's health insurance coverage is a plausible instrument.
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